A

TREATISE

ON

GOVERNMENT:

BEING

A REVIEW of the DOCTRINE

OF AN

Original Contract.

More particularly as it respects

The RIGHTS of GOVERNMENT,

AND

The DUTY of ALLEGIANCE.

Οἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι Προστάντες μετ' ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι ὑπηρετοῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς, καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι. Thucydides Lib. III. §. 82.

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TO THE

EDITOR.

SIR,

WHEN I ſent you thoſe Papers, I was ſo far from thinking any Preface or Introduction to the Subject neceſſary, that I look'd upon the Papers themſelves as no more than an Introduction to what might be ſaid upon it. As to the general Turn of Prefaces they may be only conſider'd as having given the Author an Opportunity, under pretence of an Apology for his Writings, to addreſs a Dedication to himſelf. But as the Author would be nameleſs, this part becomes leſs needful: he rather wiſhes, in what reſpects himſelf, that his

Life in the whole courſe of it ſhould be led as it were by Stealth.

Maluit & mutas agitare inglorius artes—

And as to the Papers, if they have nothing in them worth an idle half-hour's reading, I ſhou'd be ſorry to ſee them reduced ſtill lower, and need the Recommendation of a Preface.

But I am aware that when I acquaint the Reader with the Subject, the Doctrine of them will appear ſo unpopular as to need a great deal of Apology: yet I cannot but apprehend, that that Spirit of Licentiouſneſs, which makes ſuch an Undertaking ſo unpopular, makes it ſtill more uſeful and more neceſſary: and be this my Apology.

It hath been long the Faſhion (for there is as much a Faſhion in Thinking as in Dreſs) to treat, under a pretended Zeal for Liberty, the *Imperium* in ſuch a manner as to looſen all the Ties of it, and to diſunite and diſtract all the *Orders* and *Connections* of which it ſubſiſts. And this is done not by a few, or any one Party or Faction, but ſo univerſally, that theſe Politicks become the Maxims to which all refer, and the Principles from which all reaſon and act, that reaſon or act upon any Principles at all. In oppoſition to theſe

theſe miſchievous Errors, I have endeavour'd to inquire how far, upon the ſame Principles of Liberty, the Injuries offer'd to Government may be repair'd; how that *Imperium*, that τάξις καὶ κατάσασις τῆς Πολέως— that particular Frame of ORDERS and SUBORDINATIONS, of which a Government is compoſed, may be ſtrengthned and refitted; How thoſe ſeveral *Orders* may be reſtor'd to their Ranks, and the ſeveral *Subordinations* again connected under their reſpective Commands, ſo as to form *one Whole* capable of receiving and being actuated by *one united actuating Spirit* which is appointed by All. And this by endeavoring in a curſory manner (for the Papers I ſent you are but an Epitome of what I had put together upon this Subject) to give ſuch an account of this IMPIRE, as being drawn from *Nature* and *Fact* will ſhew that it is not a mere *artificial Form* fram'd and made up any how at the Will of every Legiſlator, but an *actual natural Syſtem* ariſing by the Vigor of natural Principles from that *Balance of Property*, which is founded in the Scite and Circumſtances of each People and their Country.

Now here is the Point that needs moſt Explanation, and which I am leaſt able to give.

For by founding the *Balance of Power* in the Influence of the *Balance of Property*, I may ſeem to defend profeſſedly that Syſtem of Corruption ſo generally practiſed and ſo juſtly decried. I can only anſwer, that Nature gives good and ſalutary Means which Man miſapplies; the very Minerals and Vegetables which Nature gives for Uſe and Health, the perverſe Art of Man can render deadly and deſtructive. Thus in the Caſe before us, Nature points out the Ways of *Peace and good Policy*; but Man, ever labouring out of Good ſtill to find means of Evil, deviates into Error and Confuſion. If I were acquainted with the Methods of Adminiſtrations I could point out how far the true and legal Influence extends, and where its Abuſe, that Syſtem of Corruption, begins.—But I, who am uninſtructed in the refined Policies of States, I, who never ſaw a Court, cannot do this—I wiſh I could—Then might I eaſily obviate all Imputation which may be laid upon me for this Doctrine. Yet thus far I am certain, that they are as different as Light and Darkneſs; and that the one is abſolutely true, legal and neceſſary, the other falſe, unjuſtifiable and deſtructive.

Altho' this be far beyond my Power and Province, yet it will be well worth any

Patriot

Patriot Prince's while to conſider this Diſtinction. For altho' to govern by Corruption, as a Syſtem, is not only fooliſh and wicked, but impoſſible, becauſe ſuch Corruption deſtroys that plaſtic Quality of the Individual by which he is capable of Government; yet to adhere to this natural and conſtitutional Influence will alway be found true and good Policy. For any Power without this Balance in its Favour, will be an empty Word and nothing more; and wherever this Balance fails, or is not attended to, there will ſuch Power proportionably ſink, or all be in Confuſion; and ſince this hath fail'd all hath been in Confuſion; except in that glorious Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, the Policy of whoſe wiſe Miniſters had the happy Succeſs to ſupply its Defects, and by ſuch Meaſures as hath render'd that Reign, as Mr. *Harrington* ſays, a mere Romance of Love Intrigues betwixt the Throne and People. And that we are now in Peace is owing to that Policy which hath again reſtor'd this Strength by an *artificial Balance* created in its Favour. How far indeed artful Miniſters may at times have been tempted, to mix with it the undue Influence of Corruption, is much beyond my Knowledge to apprehend; yet ſure it hath

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more the Look of good Policy to ſuffer the Tares a while to grow up with the good Seed, than with an haſty Hand without Diſtinction to root up all together.

But there remains Matter of ſtill greater Objection to theſe Papers, namely, that the Doctrine advanc'd in them, is directly the reverſe of thoſe Sentiments which have lately been taught the World by the beſt Writer, and moſt able Stateſman that this Age hath ſeen, and who from the greateſt political Experience muſt have the real preciſe Claim to writing from Nature and Fact. Who ſays, that Heaven hath pointed out *the few* choice Spirits *of ſuperior Parts* to be the Governors of Mankind. If theſe Notions are ſo different, which I cou'd wiſh and even hope they are not; the firſt, and I think the principal thing which I muſt ſay for myſelf is, that theſe Papers were not written with any Affectation of entering the Liſts with ſo known and great a Name, but were drawn up ſome Years ago, merely for Self-amuſement, and my own private Inſtruction; and the Deſign of publiſhing them, tho' it hath been ſince determin'd, was thought of long before I ever ſaw or heard the leaſt of theſe Letters. But I can hope, and imagine I even ſee, that they do not dif-

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fer ſo widely. For tho' it be this noble Author's Sentiments, it is the reſting of the Etherial Spirit on the Heads of *the few of ſuperior Parts* that points out their *general Deſtination*; yet 'tis their *reſpective Scite and Circumſtances* in political Life, that ſhows their *particular Deſtination*. Which *peculiar Situation* I ſuppoſe to be determin'd by the working of another Spirit, I mean *That* which is reſpectively eſſential to every *Imperium*. To find out which Situation, where a Man may and can act with the greateſt Exertion of his Abilities, is, by the by, one of the grand Secrets of Life.

Yet as the Principles advanc'd in theſe Papers *ſeem* to contradict thoſe of this noble Author, I, nameleſs thing as I am, ſhould think it the higheſt Preſumption, to oppoſe them with any Authority that ſhould diſgrace him in the Compariſon; and when I cannot but adhere to thoſe I have eſpous'd, 'tis becauſe Hiſtory tells me, that all the great Legiſlators and Founders of Governments in ancient Policy have acted on theſe Principles; becauſe all the ancient Writers too on theſe Matters have reaſon'd from the ſame. And becauſe in all free Governments, Men and Societies of *Men of Property* have been ever

jealous of *Men of Parts*, and have ever objected againſt ſuch taking the Lead meerly in right of Genius, and uſurping the Management of a Property which they have no ſhare in; in ſuch Caſes the Proprietors are apt to preſume (tho' probably at the ſame Time conſcious of an Inferiority of Parts) that they are ſufficiently well apprized of the true Intereſt of their own Property, to be able to manage it themſelves, and to turn it to their own beſt Purpoſes.

And when I ſay further, that free Governments do not only take their Riſe from theſe Principles, but ought to be and can only be adminiſter'd on theſe Maxims, 'tis becauſe I am taught that in thoſe Governments, of whoſe political State there is any account, this was their Policy and Method of Adminiſtration; as may be ſeen in the *Athenian*, and throughout the *Roman* Hiſtory. And becauſe in the very Caſe ſuppos'd, in the Idea of the Patriot Prince, I read that *T. Quinctius* acted upon theſe Principles: and ſure no Stateſman here, of the firſt Magnitude, will think he ſuffers by the Competition of ſuch illuſtrious Examples. But if we conſider the Conduct of theſe two great Men more near, it may throw a better Light on

the Subject in general. The noble Author of the Idea of a Patriot Prince, ſuppoſes a corrupted, ſelf-intereſted, licentious People, loſt to all Senſe of Virtue and all Shame, profligate, prodigal, venal, this is the Evil.——He ſuppoſes a Patriot Prince to be rais'd up by ſome good Providence to govern this People, this is the Bleſſing and Remedy.—The Caſe in which *T. Quinctius*, no leſs a Patriot Prince, was employ'd, is preciſely the ſame. *Pergit ire in Theſſaliam, ubi* non liberandæ modo *civitates erant*, ſed ex omni colluvione *& confuſione in aliquam tolerabilem formam redigendæ. nec enim temporum modo vitiis, ac violentiâ & licentiâ regiâ turbati erant, ſed inquieto etiam ingenio gentis; nec Comitia, nec Conventum, nec Concilium ullum, non per ſeditionem ac tumultum, jam inde à principio, ad noſtram uſque ætatem traducentes.* Now the Conduct recommended to the Patriot Prince is, to form to himſelf an Adminiſtration of ſuch who have a larger Portion of the etherial Spirit, without any regard to the Conſideration of what Channel and in what Hands the Balance of Property and Power lyes, and to call back the Government to its firſt Principles, by reſtoring a conſtitutional Spirit among the People, reſting his

Cauſe

Cauſe the while on the conſtitutional Strength of the Crown and the Concurrence of the People. If here we are to underſtand the Power of *ſuperior Parts*, in Contradiſtinction to the Influence of the *Balance of Property*: and if the Maxims explain'd in the following Papers, and confirm'd by theſe Authorities be true: then the Principles on which theſe Letters are form'd, and the Meaſures recommended to the Patriot Prince, inſtead of healing, uniting and reſtoring, do ſeem more likely to run ALL into *Party* and Diſtraction: and to hazard and betray any *Impire* that wou'd govern itſelf by them. For the conſtitutional Strength of any *Impire*, conſiſts in nothing but in the Concurrence of the People: *vis omnis in conſenſu obedientium*, and where the Conſtitution is perverted and broke in upon, and the People corrupted, the People become incapable of this conſtitutional Concurrence, according to the Maxim of *Fulvius Flaccus*, *ſine Imperio Multitudinem, nullius rei inter ſe ſociam, ad conſenſum inhabilem.* So this only Support, on which he muſt reſt his Cauſe, becomes a very broken Reed; and if this Power fails, the Thought of governing ſuch a People, in ſuch Circumſtances, with any other good Spirit, will be like the viſionary City of Philoſophers,

Philoſophers, *quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt.* Unleſs, as *Livy* ſays, we can ſuppoſe the People wiſe in the few, and virtuous in the whole, *aut principes graviores temperantioreſque a cupidine imperii, aut multitudinem melius moratam fieri poſſe,* which is the reverſe of this Caſe. ——If on the other hand we attend to the Conduct of *T. Quinctius,* we ſhall ſee how all that Peace, that Unity, that good Policy (to introduce which into Government is the profeſs'd Deſign of theſe Letters) may be brought about, namely, by the ſingle Meaſures of regulating the Balance of Power and Property, in ſuch a manner, that the Balance of Power may be in thoſe Hands, whom it moſt concerns to ſee the State adminiſter'd in Liberty, Safety and Peace. A CENSU maxime & *Senatum & Judices legit: potentioremque eam partem civitatum fecit, cui ſalva tranquillaque omnia magis eſſe expediebat.*—

After this great Example, it will be the Intereſt of any Patriot Prince to give his whole Attention to this Balance; and it will be the Duty of every Subject that is a Friend to the Peace and Liberty of his Country, to wiſh to ſee every Individual in the full and peaceable Poſſeſſion of his Property, and that Power

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which it naturally gives him; to ſee Union, Harmony and Concurrence in that part where is the greateſt aggregate of Property; and the Balance of Power in ſuch Hands, who by their Property are moſt deeply concern'd in the Welfare and Intereſt of the State, and for the ſame Reaſons have the greateſt Opportunities of being beſt acquainted with it.

A TREA-

A TREATISE ON GOVERMENT, &c.

SOME Time after the late Troubles of the Kingdom were ſo happily ended, I was invited by my Friend A** to ſpend a Month or two with him. He was a Man who had made the beſt Advantages of a liberal Education, and a Knowledge of the World.—he had with him an old Friend of his Father's, a Man of much Reading, and eſteem'd by the Gentlemen of the Neighbourhood a great Scholar; a Man of great Candour and Humanity; and of a Livelineſs unuſual in People of his Age; which made him agreeable, and his Acquaintance valu'd every where.—Accordingly toward the latter End of the Year, I went to S** his Seat; it had been the Manſion-houſe of the Family for many Generations, it was very large and very old: The Manner of the Building was auguſt, and preſerv'd the Spirit of the old *Engliſh* Taſte, whoſe rough Freedom pleas'd more than Regularity, affected nothing but plain honeſty, yet claim'd almoſt Veneration; and what might ſeem wanting in out-

ward Ornament, was amply recompens'd by more ſolid Convenience within; in ſhort it was very well adapted to all the purpoſes of good living. The Entrance is into a ſolemn old Hall, furniſh'd with long oaken Tables, where many an old Chief and his Followers had feaſted.—It was hung round with old Armory, and in the moſt conſpicuous Place over the Chimney, was an old Parchment Writing finely decorated on the Edges, which I ſoon diſcover'd to be a Copy of the Grand Charter. In this Room the Family met every Morning to breakfaſt in one of the old Bow-windows.

It happen'd one Morning that my Friend A**, his Friend whom * I ſhall call *B*** and myſelf met here before the reſt of the Family came down, and as at this time the Converſation of the whole People turn'd upon the Danger of the Rebellion, and the glorious Succeſs of our Troops in the Suppreſſion of it, our Converſation took the ſame turn. But as our old Friend, by the particular Courſe of his Education and Acquaintance, had a ſtrong Tincture of thoſe Principles which were the prevailing Politicks of former Reigns; the Diſcourſe began naturally to run into a Diſpute of that particular Connection there is between the Subject and the Government. I was apprehenſive from the ſanguine Diſpoſition of my Friend *A*** it might grow too particular; there-

* Quaſi enim ipſos induxi loquentes, ne *inquam* & *inquit* ſæpius interponeretur. *Cicero.*

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fore endeavouring to make it more general, or if I could, to turn the Converſation, I ſaid to A**, I don't wonder to ſee you thus ſtrenuous in defence of thoſe Principles by which your Fathers preſerv'd, and deliver'd down to you your Liberty, ſo fair an Inheritance: For the very Air of this Place would inſpire one with ſuch Sentiments. Thoſe old Arms, that have been ſo often born in defence of that Liberty, are daily Monitors of the ſame: That ineſtimable Charter too is a living Memorial of that Spirit which has always prevail'd in this Land. Thus in the old Days of Heroiſm, their Arms and the Devices upon them were Inſtructors of ſuch Sentiments, as each Country could wiſh every Son to be inſpired with; either a generous Emulation of their Anceſtors, by repreſenting the Glories of their Family, and their heaven-deriv'd Origin: or inſinuating the Principles of Honour and publick Affection, taught under ſome fine Allegory. Thus we ſee *Achilles* Shield——

Here A** interrupted me ſomewhat warmly. I conceive what you would intimate. But (beſides that) I ſhould be ſo far from entertaining any airy Schemes to ſupport the Spirit of Liberty; unleſs from the due Senſe that a Man ought to have of his own Right and Property: that on the contrary, I think ſuch Schemes have been the Fomentors and Inſpirers of all the Troubles this Nation hath been plagued with. For when the Caprice of particular People, blindly devoted to this or that Form of Government, often inflam'd

with a mad Zeal for Innovations, ariſing from worſe Motives, ſets itſelf at work to form Parties, they will never want ſpecious Colours to dreſs out the worſt of Villanies with. And theſe are what deceive the Honeſt and Well-meaning; who from being, as you could wiſh them to be, inſpir'd with the Spirit of Liberty, and perſuaded that they are fighting under that Banner, run headlong into the laſt Extreams, till they are ruin'd by the Spirit of Madneſs. Whereas all that I would have my Children underſtand from theſe Memorials, is, that they ſhould form the true Eſtimate of their own Importance in the Community, and be well acquainted with that preciſe Character, and Weight in the Government, which their Property naturally gives them: That this ſhould be the only Standard of their civil Faith, and that they ſhould conſider theſe Arms, which have been often gallantly born in Defence of it, as deliver'd down with it for the ſame Purpoſes. And that they ſhould be ready, and dare even with their Lives, to maintain ſuch Rights, and defend ſuch Property, from any Invaſion from abroad, or any injurious Attack within, either of the People or the Government.

Now ſuch Principles can never incite them to innovate, or diſturb the Government, or act offenſively on any Pretence whatſoever; but will be a Barrier and form them rigid Champions of Liberty. For as this Rule is not imaginary but real, and founded on the very Matter of Government, it can be affected by nothing but what

reaches

reaches that Foundation: it can give no Pretence to Parties and Oppoſitions, but where the Foundation of Government itſelf is ſhaken. For while a Man feels himſelf ſafe and untouch'd in his Property, and the legal Uſe of it; whatever Jealouſies may be ſuggeſted, whatever Clamors rais'd, he will be certain that he is ſecure in his Rights and Liberty.

B**. While I cannot but with Pleaſure obſerve, that the natural turn of your Temper inclines you to the ſecuring and preſerving the Peace of Mankind; and in what manner your Benevolence wou'd make that the only End and Purpoſe of all Government; yet cannot I but ſee how ill theſe Principles, how imperfectly theſe Maxims anſwer this End. For it is of the Foundation of theſe Politics to ſet up two ſovereign and diſtinct Intereſts in the two political Perſons of the Governors and Governed, while the latter are taught to conſider themſelves originally equal with any other Individual, and free of all Dominion but what ariſes from their own Appointment; and in no other Tyes connected than by their own Compact; and that not only the People, amongſt themſelves, but that the Governors and the People were orginally equal and Independent of each other; and that the Subordination ſubſiſting between them, aroſe wholly from their own Conſents. Tho' indeed they ſay, that theſe Governors are ſovereign and independent, yet they make the People ſo too, and of theſe two ſovereign, independent, diſtinct and different

Intereſts is this Contract form'd, and in the forming it the People have many Rights and Claims to bargain for, as the Sovereign too has certain Intereſts, certain Powers to maintain. Thus they divide Mankind, as it were, into two Species of Creatures, of Kings and People. They ſay indeed Kings are appointed to the Government by the People, yet as at this very Appointment, they ſuppoſe theſe Kings to have certain Powers and Prerogatives to uphold, they ſtill make them diſtinct individual Perſons, a diſtinct Party to this Contract. Thus theſe two Parties enter into Compact or a defenſive Alliance, where the Conditions to be perform'd are, on one hand Allegiance, and Protection on the other, and that theſe are reciprocal. Thus in the Entrance, in the very Foundation of theſe Politics, inſtead of being a Community, an Union of ſeveral Individuals under one common Intereſt and Empire, it is a mere Coalition or Alliance of two different and diſtinct Intereſts.

Thus the Writers on theſe Matters, who talk ſo much of an Original Contract, do not inquire how theſe contracting Parties came to be ſuch, but think it ſufficient, beginning from the State of the Caſe that there are two ſuch, to prove that each in their own Rights are ſovereign and independent, where it is the Duty of Each to preſerve and ſecure and ſtrengthen their reſpective Rights, to award off the Encroachments of the other, and confine him within his legal Bounds and Power. Hence it is of the very Eſſence of

theſe Governments to ſubſiſt, and be carried on, by Parties and Oppoſitions, as the noble Author of the Diſſertation on Parties hath fully ſhown.

A**. Truly I muſt own there is ſomething in the Fortune that theſe Politics have met with, which may give Grounds for this Repreſentation of them; yet it is as far from their real Colour as Black is from White. But as a great Reaſoner well obſerves on this Point, * "The Theory of "Civil Society founded on an Original Contract, "has had the Fortune to fall into ill Hands, the "Enemies of their Country, who inforc'd it "not to defend the Liberties we enjoy'd, but "to alter the Eſſence of the Conſtitution." Nay further they have ſuffer'd equal Perverſion from the Injudiciouſneſs of their Aſſertors; for while many treating of this Matter, have endeavour'd to illuſtrate and exemplify this Point from actual Inſtances, they have thrown this very Light upon it that you charge it with. They find no actual Examples but in the Compoſitions and Agreements that have been the final Iſſue of contending Parties; or the Compoſitions between Kings and their Subjects, who having been drove to War to ſupport themſelves againſt the Uſurpation of ſuch Kings, have claimed and gained by the Law of Arms, that which was their Right by the Law of Nature, as that ſacred Charter there. Or otherwiſe in the Treaties between two Nations that have been at War, where upon a

* Mr. *Warburton.*

Peace the leſſer has been taken into the Protection, and united into the *Impire* of the greater; as there are many Inſtances in the courſe of the *Roman* Hiſtory. In all theſe Caſes indeed the Contract is between two ſovereign, independent and different Intereſts; where both Parties are two actually exiſting Perſons, have different Demands to make, and different Rights and Claims to be ſatisfied. But originally in Nature there can be no ſuch difference of Perſons. Every Individual is equal, and as of equal Claims and Rights ſo of equal Power and Authority, therefore if we look upon the firſt Conſtituents, the Governors are but Individuals of the ſame perſonal private Rights and Power, as the Governed. Thus we ſee ſuch Inſtances do not illuſtrate but pervert this Point. For the Caſe, in order to ſuit theſe Examples, ſhould ſtand as follows: A ſet of People herding together, a meer rabble Rout without public Senſe or Power to conduct themſelves, meet with ſome one or more of theſe *kingly Perſonages*, who muſt be ſuppoſed on their Part to have eſſentially from Nature ſuch Royal public Power, but no People to exerciſe it on; this Herd, on the other ſide, muſt be ſuppoſed to be eſſentially a ſervile leading Flock wanting a Leader; and that theſe two Parties, having thus luckily met with each other, immediately ſettle a Conference for ſtriking a Bargain. The People promiſe to ſubmit themſelves to his Guiding and Juriſdiction, if he will undertake to lead and protect them: while he on his Part promiſes to

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be their Father and Protector, if they will put themſelves under his *Impire* and Dominion. This wou'd indeed be ſetting out with two different Intereſts inſtead of one Community.

But really in Nature there can be no ſuch Caſe, the Parties, to the Contract we mean, are each Individual conſenting to the Whole and every Particular * "to join and unite into one Com-"munity, for their comfortable, ſafe and peace-"able living amongſt one another, in a ſecure "Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater "Security againſt any that are not of it:" And when they have agreed upon the Methods and Means of promoting this End, they appoint ſome one amongſt them (as they cannot all do it) to adminiſter and execute theſe Meaſures. Thus the Parties to the Original Contract are not the People, as the Party on one hand, and the King, as on the other; but before any ſuch *Political Perſons* are form'd, the Compact Deed is executed, and every Individual Conſtituent of the Community, in their own *private* Perſons, are Parties to it, and are bound to the Whole and to each Particular, for the Performance and Support of it.

B**. Well be it ſo—Yet however theſe Political Perſons may have aroſe; or whoever may have been the original Parties to this Contract; however the *Imperium* may have been brought about: Yet is it not ſtill of the Conſtitution of ſuch

* *Lock* on Government, § 95.

Governments,

Governments, who ſuppoſe themſelves founded on an Original Contract, to conſider this Contract as actually and really ſubſiſting between the King and People, and that each Party is bound and engaged to look to the juſt Performance and Execution thereof? And that any Act of either Party fundamentally contrary to ſuch Conſtitution of the Government, is an actual Breach of that Contract? And that it is at all times the Duty, which either owe to themſelves, to ſee that the other does not infringe the Contract to his Detriment? Is not this the ultimate preciſe State of the Caſe, in whatever view you conſider it? whether with the ſpeculative Politicians as a mix'd Government, or with the Lawyers as a compact Deed and Bond to obſerve the Laws, which is this Contract?

If with the Philoſophers you talk of a Mixt Government, you conſider That Order and Subordination, by which alone a number of People can be capable of acting as one Body, as capable of taking three Forms; either where the actuating Power is collected and reſides in one, and is call'd Monarchy; or where by a more equal Diviſion, it is in the Hands of thoſe few whoſe Weight and Property give them this Influence, and is call'd Ariſtocracy; or where the Circumſtances and Humour of the People ſuffer no one to out-grow his Neighbour, or to have more than any other Perſon, where it is thus diffus'd amongſt the whole, and is call'd Democracy. You are taught to conſider theſe three Forms

as

as the only ſimple Forms of Government. But that when the Power is thus wholly reſident in any one Part of the People to the Excluſion of the reſt, it muſt be oppreſſive and tyrannical. That therefore the beſt Governments are fram'd and accorded of theſe three ſeveral Forms, that is, where the Power is divided amongſt the People in all the three Ways in which they are capable of exerciſing it, ſo that each Part may have its due Proportion of Influence. From this right Diſtribution, and from each being able to preſerve its own Share, and award off the Encroachments of the other; or from any two being able to prevent the other that he grows not too great, and amaſſes not too much Power, ariſes the Perfection of this Conſtitution. This is, I believe, the cleareſt Idea we conceive of what is call'd by theſe Reaſoners, a Mixt Government; and yet ſee the Effects of it, 'tis of the very Conſtitution of this, as I ſaid before, to ſubſiſt and be carried by Parties and Oppoſitions: for it conſiſts of divers and different Parties, which can only ſubſiſt by oppoſing and being a Check upon each other.

I know what fine things *Polybius* ſays of theſe three being ſo happily conſtituted in the *Roman* Government, that each ſeparately was capable of exerting its reſpective Power and Influence over the reſt, and yet none able to claſh or interfere with the Power of another; but if inſtead of inſtancing in any actual State, he had ſaid, it was poſſible it might be ſo, he cou'd not

ſo

ſo eaſily have been controverted from matter of Fact: but unluckily the *Roman* State is an Inſtance to the contrary. Can any Party ſupport itſelf unleſs it hath a Power ſufficient to enforce its legal Influence? and if it hath actually ſuch Power as to be capable to enforce its Acts, it may exert an illegal or undue Influence; and muſt not this be contrary to the Intereſt of any other that is connected with it? Therefore any Conſtitution explain'd from this Idea, muſt conſiſt not only of different, but contrary Parties, and conſequently of Oppoſitions.

Government we know abridges every Individual of that Liberty, which in a State of Nature he is born to, and in whatſoever Hands the adminiſtring Power reſides, 'tis the Duty, the Intereſt, 'tis of the very Eſſence of that Power, that the People ſhou'd be kept in Subordination to the actual Influence of it; ſo that it is the Intereſt of the Monarchical Part to keep the Connections and Stricture of Subordination as cloſe and faſt bound as poſſible. On the contrary, it is the Spirit and Policy of a free People to preſerve all their Liberty as clear and detach'd of all external Influence as poſſible; "to hold "themſelves free by as enlarg'd an Immunity as "they can, to live and do as they pleaſe, to ſub-"mit to no perſonal Influence, however as little "as may be *." Thus it becomes the Intereſt of the Democratic Part, to be a conſtant Clog

* Ariſt. de Repub. Lib. 6. cap. 2.

and

and Check upon the Meaſures of the adminiſtring Power, and to oppoſe themſelves to every new Exertion of its Influence. Here there are two different Parties whoſe Intereſt is eſſentially contrary, and who can alone ſubſiſt by the Struggles of Oppoſition.

Nay it is of the Spirit of this Policy to ſpeak of theſe as ſet up to be a Counterbalance the one to the other, to oppoſe, check and impede the other. Hence a Balance of Power, and a due Regulation of this Balance, is of the Eſſence of this Conſtitution. Now as betwixt Nation and Nation the preſerving and guarantying ſuch foreign Balance has linked all the Powers of *Europe* in a perpetual Series of War and Bloodſhed, ſo the ſupporting and reſtoring this domeſtic Balance amidſt the Powers of Government, has been the Pretence and Occaſion of all the Factions, Rebellions, and Civil Wars that this Kingdom hath been torn and diſtracted with. Like the fighting of the Elements this Strife may produce ſome happy Form at laſt, but in the mean while the unhappy Conſtituents are deſtroy'd and ruin'd. "The true Meaning of a Balance of "Power (ſays an ingenious Writer) is beſt con-"ceiv'd, by conſidering what the Nature of a "Balance is. It ſuppoſes three things; firſt the "Part which is held together with the Hand "that holds it; and then the two Scales with "whatever is weigh'd therein." Now as infinite Accidents ſhall happen, and Circumſtances ariſe, to the Interruption of this tender Conſtitution (for

you

you ſee on how tickliſh a Point its Peace and Safety lyes) from that Inſtant muſt all be in Confuſion and Diſorder; the whole State muſt be going to Wreck and Ruin; and if it can be a while upheld, it will drag on a fev'riſh Being, amidſt the Delirium of Parties and Factions, amidſt the Uproar of Tumult and Sedition, and at length die miſerably, amidſt all the Horrors of Rebellion and Maſſacre. I know how we are taught to ſay this Balance may be preſerv'd by the Addreſs, Conduct and Integrity of the Hand that holds it; but how little does Experience teach us to expect from this! The groſſer and more uſual way is, by calling in and adding to the lighter Scale, the Influence of ſome external Power, thus indeed a kind of Equilibrium is preſerv'd, but the Beam, on which the Balance reſts, is in the mean Time overcharg'd and broken down.

Or if with the Lawyers we conſider the Laws as a Contract between King and People, a mere voluntary mutual Covenant between two free and independent Parties; we ſhall in the Event find that the Conditions of it, between Prerogative and Privileges, muſt be ſo vague and indeterminate, the Obligations of it ſo looſe and imperfect, that theſe Principles ſhall prove the very Seeds of Anarchy and the Diſſolution of Government. In how many different Methods ſhall the Inſolence of Power explain this away? What but Power can determine and fix the Barrier between theſe two? And after all, on which ſide ſoever is the greater Power, Pretexts and Caſuiſtry will be never there wanting

wanting to find Colour and Reaſons for every Violence of it. If it can be ſaid that the firſt covenanting of this Contract was an Act of Freedom; upon every Temptation and Opportunity it will be broke at Random. It will be ſupported, while it is kept, by nothing but the conſtant Strife and Struggles of the contracting Parties; and either ſide, if it be in their Power, will keep it no longer than is convenient for them. "Lady *K*—, ſays Mr. *Selden*, articled with Sir "*E*—— *H*——, that he ſhou'd come to her "when ſhe ſent for him, and ſtay with her as "long as ſhe would have him, to which he ſet "his Hand: then he articled with her that he "ſhou'd go away when he pleas'd, and ſtay "away as long as he pleas'd, to which ſhe ſet "her Hand, this is the Epitome of all the Con-"tracts in the World betwixt Prince and Sub-"ject, they keep them as long as they like them, "and no longer."

Thus upon the whole, we ſee theſe boaſted Principles of Liberty, how well ſo ever they may ſerve the Purpoſes of Parties and Factions, are ſo far from being the Principles of Peace and good Government, that they are the very Seeds of Confuſion and Anarchy; and I do verily believe that, whatever the Mob of Politicians may think, and however the Leaders of ſuch Mob may contrive to give this illuſtrious Colour to their Deſigns, That theſe Politics are only the Pretexts of the ingenious Few (and what cannot a Combination of the Ingenious make faſhionable?)

to impoſe upon the ſervile Many. They are only calculated for an Oppoſition, and never thought of but by artful Men, who aim to build their Power on the Deſtruction of thoſe in Power. For they are incompatible with any eſtabliſh'd Power. Though we may think highly of Man, and talk big of the Power of Reaſon, the Energy of Truth, the Force of Liberty, and ſuch Vaunting. Yet ſo mechanically do we all act by Habit and Cuſtom, that Experience ſays, Mankind will be always found (give them but ſome cant Terms and Phraſes to amuſe them) ſervilely ductile under every Frame and Faſhion, that the artful and ingenious ſhall think proper to dreſs out their Deſigns with. Give them but an Opportunity to run wild about, venting their ill Humour and ill Manners; and nothing is too abſurd or extravagant for them. To ſuch a Pitch of Enthuſiaſm and Folly ſhall the Contagion work itſelf, that tell them but that *the Monument is in Danger*, and half Mankind ſhall run mad after a May-pole.

A**. It is certain, that *theſe* Politicks are only calculated for Parties and Oppoſitions, and indeed were never entertain'd but by ſuch, and in the manner that you have repreſented them, could never be uſed to any other Purpoſes. For ſuch Politicians being wholly intent and ſolicitous to diſengage the popular Intereſt from the undue Influence and Dominion of the regal Power, forgetting in the mean while that the Government is a Community, a one common Intereſt of the individual

individual conſtituent Intereſts, their whole Force and Reaſon has been employ'd to fortify and ſecure the People, their Liberties and Property, to fence them in a ſeparate Part, and as it were, broke off from the Community, a peculiar *Impire*, a diſtinct Commonwealth *.

Thus whoever have wrote upon this Subject amid the Struggles of a State about Prerogative and Liberty, about the Encroachments of the Few upon the Rights of the Many, and of the Many upon the Privileges of the Few, they have all concurr'd in repreſenting this Contract, not as the common Conſociation of a Number of equal Conſtituents entering into Community, but as a mere Treaty of Alliance between King and People †, and ſuch like political Parties. This Repreſentation is, I am afraid, too conſonant to the Sentiments of Parties, not to be too common: Yet is as far from being the true Caſe, as a mere Treaty of Alliance betwixt two federate Nations is from an Union of thoſe two Nations into one Society or Government ‖.——If this was indeed the Caſe, all the Evils, which you mention to enſue from theſe Politics, might be truly urg'd

* Plebem, quam partem veluti abruptam â cætero populo, veſtram Patriam peculiaremque Remp. feciſtis. *Livius Lib.* 3. §. 19.

† Ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικήσουσιν ἀλλήλοις. *Ariſt. de Rep. Lib.* 3. *c.* 9.

‖ Καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυῤῥηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν εἰσὶ γὲν αὐτοῖς συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων, καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας· ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἄρχαι πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τέλοις κοῖναι, &c. *Ariſt. de Rep. Lib.* 3. *c.* 9.

upon us in their utmoſt Conſequences. There would then be two diſtinct Parties with diſtinct and contrary Intereſts, and have nothing to connect them, but the alternate Fear of each other, or the united Fear of ſome common Enemy. And though under the immediate Impreſſion of Danger this latter might unite them, yet the other would be the inveterate Spirit of Faction, each reſpectively could promiſe himſelf no Security but in the Incapacity of the other to hurt him; neither would either dare to advantage the other, leſt he ſhould make him too powerful for himſelf: So that the very Alliance muſt be vitiated with Jealouſy, and the Communion carried on by Strife and Contention.

Indeed you may as well ſay, *theſe Politics* are only fit for Parties and Sedition, and all the black Train of Faction; for they are only and wholly the perverted Repreſentations of miſtaken or factious Men; whoſe only Field of Action, or Opportunity of Intereſt, is in the Confuſion and Diſtraction of all the Powers of Government: Men who fear nothing ſo much as the Peace and Harmony of the Orders of the State, becauſe it muſt inevitably take away all Occaſion of this bad Popularity; ſo, like poor needy Mechanicks, make themſelves work, alway willing to have ſomething wrong in the Conſtitution, that there may be ſomething which requires them to cure it*.——

——Whenever

* Si unquam dubitatum eſt, Quirites, utrum Tribuni Plebis veſtrâ an ſuâ causâ ſeditionum ſemper auctores fuerint, id ego

——Whenever thus in any State it can become the Intereſt of Particulars to make a Breach and Diviſion in the *Impire*, they can never want ſpecious Pretences nor Tools to work upon, to form ſuch Oppoſition, and to perſuade ſuch, that it is in a diſtinct Intereſt from the Government, and that it is conſtitutional, and what not? With ſuch, as may be ſeen through the whole *Diſſertation on Parties*, Oppoſitions become the virtuous Support of Liberty, and a noble watchful Care for the common Intereſt of Mankind. It is *theſe minor Patriots* who not having Parts or Intereſt ſufficient to maintain and act with the real Powers of Government, and but juſt Art and Intrigue enough to work themſelves into the Lead of ſome Party in it, muſt there ventilate their poor Spirit of Ambition: It is from *theſe* Demagogues and their Followers, that we hear of Governments being compounded of different Intereſts: It is *theſe* that talk of a Balance and Counterbalance, of one Power being conſtitutionally a Check upon another; and that it is conſtitutionally the Duty of theſe to pull different Ways, even where there be no real Matter of Difference, yet to preſerve the Equilibrium of Power. Or if they find with all their Throat

ego hoc anno deſiſſe dubitari, certum habeo——quid illos aliud aut tum timuiſſe creditis, aut hodie turbare velle, niſi concordiam Ordinum? quam diſſolvendæ maxime Tribunitiæ poteſtatis rentur eſſe? Sic herculè tanquam artifices improbi, opus quærunt; qui & ſemper ægri aliquid eſſe in Repub. volunt, ut ſit, ad cujus curationem à vobis adhibeantur. *Liv. Lib.* 5. §. 3.

and Lungs that they are not able to gain that Influence, which they could wiſh to be at the Head of, then the Balance is deſtroy'd, and the Conſtitution is gone to Wreck : *Obſecro Populares, ferte miſero atque innocenti auxilium—Save my Country, Heaven! Save the good old Conſtitution, for I love the Conſtitution of my Country!* This or idler Cant will do, and be call'd *Liberty*, where there is a *Spirit of Licentiouſneſs* amongſt the People.

But let *us* conſider the Matter more diſpaſſionately, we muſt know that all ſuch Individuals as are aſſociated under one Communion can have but one common Intereſt ; and that all the leſſer Communities, fram'd upon ſuch a one common Intereſt, muſt be all linked together under one continu'd Concatenation. Now this Intereſt is the very Soul and Spirit of the Government ; and ſuch Government can only ſubſiſt by the concurring Conſent of all its Powers in their ſeveral Subordinations to this Intereſt. But where any one Part is taught to conſider itſelf, not as connected with the whole by any Intercommunity of Right and Intereſt, but merely ally'd by voluntary Compact for the Preſervation of its diſtinct Intereſts ; and that the Protection of ſuch is the only End of Government, and the Support of it ought to be the only Meaſures of its Policy : It becomes the Politics of *ſuch* to hold themſelves as diſtinct and unconnected as poſſible, and to talk much of *the Independency of the Powers of Government*. But if this Ma-

lady

lady has touch'd but one the moſt minute extream Part of a State (ſo virulent is the Poiſon) it ſhall ſpread itſelf through the whole People, and infect and corrupt the whole Maſs, and where that Corruption hath once broke out, it will glut itſelf with the total Ruin of that Conſtitution.

It were endleſs to obſerve how many free People have loſt their Liberty, by their Leaders uſing the Principles of Liberty to the baſe Purpoſes of Party and Faction. For where theſe Fiends have once inſinuated themſelves, or been *impoſed upon a People under this fair diſguiſe*, they have never failed to break all that Order and Harmony, and to diſſolve that Communion, by which alone a Government can ſubſiſt. We read in *Livy*, that this one Plague had ſeiz'd all the States in *Italy*, theſe *Principles of Independency* between the People and their Governors, and between one Power of the Government and another*. And we read in *Livy* that all theſe States were deſtroyed. We ſee in our own State, that this Party Policy has been long the reigning Principle, and That *Independency*, which is to diſunite and diſſolve all Connection amid the Powers of Government, has been the only Spirit of Liberty: But may no Ages yet in the Womb of Time ever feel the dreadful Conſequences of it.

* Unus velut Morbus invaſerat omnes Italiæ Civitates, ut Plebes ab Optimatibus diſſentirent: Senatus Romanis faveret, Plebs ad Pœnos rem traheret. *Lib.* 24. §. 2.

That the Mob and noiſy Part of Mankind ſhould be thus miſled is nothing ſtrange: But one would wonder how the thinking Part, that mean not to falſify, ſhould be thus deceiv'd. But when the Infirmity of Man's Nature is conſider'd, how long a Perſon may revolve, and even perceive any Sentiment, may ſee ſome faint Relation and Connections of the Ideas it is compos'd of, and yet not be able to frame and model it, ſo as to repreſent it to his own Mind as actual Knowledge: One ſees from this Infirmity, how willing the Mind is to catch at any Aſſiſtance, from thoſe artificial Forms or mechanical Frames that may ſerve in general to cloath and convey its Ideas with. It is thus we hear of pure Ariſtocracy and Democracy, though there be no ſuch thing as either in Nature, Art, or Example; it is hence we hear of Governments mixed and compounded of the three pure Forms, as of three actual diſtinct things; it is hence we talk of the People's having the Lead in the *Imperium*, though we know that it is impoſſible that any People in the Bulk ſhould be capable of Counſel. Here we talk of the WISE FEW the Senate having the Lead, though here too we know it is impoſſible that any Number of Equals can long ſubſiſt without ſome LEADING ONE at the Head of them. While we pleaſe ourſelves with talking of theſe three Parties as ſubſiſting actually by themſelves, though at the ſame time we might know that they actually cannot ſo ſubſiſt; We diſtract that Communion,

by

by which alone theſe could have any Subſiſtence at all.—This Method of repreſenting the thing, while it is only meant for the Eaſe of Conception, and ready explaining the Matter is uſeful and ſcientific; but when it is introduc'd into Practice, as a true Diſſection and Analyſis of an actual exiſting Syſtem, and thus apply'd to the Purpoſes of Policy, it is the Ground of all the Error and Confuſion that can embroil and miſlead a People. In the firſt Light it hath been conſider'd by all the great and wiſe Reaſoners in this Matter, but in the latter by none but miſtaken or deſigning Men.

And it is thus the Folly and Villany of Mankind have conſpir'd to miſrepreſent and pervert thoſe Principles, which to be rightly inform'd of is of the utmoſt Conſequence to them.

*B***. Be this Deſcription of the Matter, and this Explanation of the Form, of this Policy, how it will; yet from the Nature of the End of theſe Principles, I do not ſee how any Man can be oblig'd to ſubject himſelf to the State, any otherwiſe than by his own Conſent, or any longer than thoſe Meaſures of Government, to which he conſented, when he connected himſelf, are purſu'd. All Men, you ſay, are equal by Nature; all Men are born free, and in a State of Nature, till they do connect themſelves; and they can be connected by nothing but their own free Will and Act: And the Conditions of their Connection can be no other than according to their own Conſent. "For a Child

" is born a Subject of no Country or Govern-
" ment whatever*." No Compact of his Father's can be binding to him, nothing but his own Conſent can connect him. " For every " Man's Children, being by Nature as free as " himſelf, or any of his Anceſtors ever were, " may, whilſt they are in that Freedom, chooſe " what Society they will join themſelves to, " what Commonwealth they will put themſelves " under †."

Thus in the forming of Government, nothing in the World can give the State a Claim upon the Service of one who hath not of his own Accord willingly vouchſafed to ſubject himſelf, and this by ſome Overt Act ‖. This Overt Act is the accepting the Terms of the Government, and ſubmitting himſelf to it on the Conditions of enjoying that Protection, which ſuch Government gives to the civil and perſonal Rights of its Subjects. This Allegiance is thus only conditional: And the Conditions of the Obligation are reciprocal to the Protection given. So that if the Perſon has not yet put himſelf under the Protection of the Government; or is by any legal Diſabilities excluded from it: or if the Conditions of ſuch Protection are not fulfill'd but broke: or if that Protection hath been any how withdrawn ſo that the Subject is forc'd to put himſelf under

* Locke *on* Gov. *Treat.* 2. §. 118.

† §. 73.

‖ *Men may become Members of Society by giving their Conſent either explicitly or implicitly.* Woolaſton Sect. 7. Prop. 7.

the

the Protection of ſome other State; his Allegiance, being reciprocal, will be always there, and there only, due whence he receives his Protection.

It is thus and upon theſe Principles that Dr. *Burnet*, in his Vindication of himſelf ſays, in anſwer to the Citation and criminal Letters iſſued againſt him here in *Britain*, when he was under the Protection of the States of *Holland*, that certainly a Subject may transfer his Allegiance by putting himſelf under the Protection of any foreign State: That he may become naturaliz'd to any other Government by which his Allegiance is tranſlated *. And it was upon theſe Principles that the States of *Holland* did not give him up, but ſupported him under their Protection, and call'd him their Subject.

Upon this Maxim too, when King *James* the ſecond wrote to the States, that he had Occaſion for the ſix Regiments of his Subjects that were in their Service, and deſired that they ſhould be ſent over to him, the States anſwer'd that the Regiments were theirs: They had paid Levy Money for them, and had them under no Capitulation that had reſerv'd an Authority to the King to call for them at his Pleaſure; ſo excus'd themſelves that they could not part with them; but gave Orders that all Officers that ſhould aſk their *Congè* ſhould have it †.

Upon the ſame grounds, as being reaſonable and the Cuſtom of all Nations, *Perſeus* of *Ma-*

* Burnet's *Tracts*, *Vol.* II.

† Burnet's *Hiſt. of his own Times*, *Vol.* I. *page* 734—5.

cedon

cedon anſwer'd the Pretence the *Romans* gave out, when they wanted to take Occaſion of making War upon him, namely, that he made himſelf acceſſory to the Crimes of certain Delinquents, that had been baniſh'd from *Rome*, by admitting them to his Protection. Upon theſe Grounds he reaſons to this purpoſe, that when they had withdrawn their Protection, and prohibited theſe Criminals from the Communion of their Country, to whatever State theſe Perſons, in theſe Circumſtances, betook themſelves, tendering their Service, that that State has a Right, if it pleaſes, to take them into its Protection. *Et hercule quid attinet cuiquam Exilium patere, ſi nuſquam Exuli futurus locus eſt* * ? It was upon the ſame Reaſoning, though not with equal Juſtice, that Mr. *Knight*, who was arreſted within the Juriſdiction of *Brabant*, was not ſurrender'd to the Government of *England*.

If then in any of theſe Caſes, Subjects can thus withdraw from their Allegiance, they may become independent of that Sovereignty whoſe Subjects they were: And if they are independent of that Government, they are as much in a State of Nature with it, as one Kingdom is in Reſpect of another. And therefore in like manner, ſhould any Matter of Difference ariſe (between them) and give Cauſe to Arms, they may juſtly have Recourſe to Arms, and are entitled to all the Laws thereof, as much as one Nation is with regard to

* Livius *Lib.* 42. §. 41.

another.

another. And if their Arms ſhould fail, ought to be treated no otherwiſe than Priſoners of War. For no one can have a Right (according to theſe Principles) to judge for them, or determine the Equity of their Cauſe, there can be no Appeal but to Heaven; and in that they have a Right to defend their Cauſe, even to the putting Life upon the Iſſue.

Thus theſe Principles, of a State, that founds its Eſtabliſhment in the Conſent of the Conſtituents *for the Purpoſes of Protection*, prove the Diſſolution of all Government. For by theſe Politics a Man, or a number of Men, may find equitable ways to deſert, betray, or even ſubvert the Government of his Country, and be clear of all Imputation of Treaſon or Rebellion. So that the Duty of Allegiance, which you in Power wou'd have held in ſo high Regard, becomes a mere Thumb-band or Rope of Sand.

*A***. I confeſs all this is very ſpecious; and when enforced with that Authority, which your Character gives you amongſt us, is apt to perſuade: and in matters of leſs Conſequence, I ſhou'd rather miſtruſt my own Judgment than ſuſpect yours, but I think I ſee in your reaſoning ſuch abominable Conſequences, the Seeds of perpetual War and Maſſacre, that I cannot but abhor them, even tho' I were not able to unravel theſe cunning Links of Sophiſtry, I call it ſo, becauſe you have endeavour'd to diſtreſs us even with our own Conceſſions: but tho' you are pleas'd to found your Reaſoning on our Principles, yet

when you hold them in another Light, when you throw quite another Colour on them, they can reflect that Ray only which they receive, and this with the more Luſtre on the blacker Ground. They are not the Principles of Confuſion but Order, yet you have interwove them with Anarchy; they are the only Ties by which a Man can be connected with the Government, ſaving all his Rights and Liberties; and the only Obligation that can hold him there inſeparably by his due Allegiance. For if a Man be once thus lawfully connected with the Community, no Claim in the World can diſſolve him from that Allegiance he bears to its Government; for the Community thence forward muſt have a Claim to him and his perſonal Service. And if he diſlikes the Meaſures of the Government, he has no way left to oppoſe them, but theſe formal ones, which the Community hath thought fit to eſtabliſh for the Security of its Liberty. Therefore while that Government ſubſiſts, all violent Attacks upon it, by any Part of the Community, can be deem'd nothing but Rebellion, and all Invaſions of its Rights, by any Part of it, can be reckon'd nothing but Treaſon.

*B***. I fancy I apprehend your Argument, namely, that while any People live under the Protection of the State, and enjoy the Rights and Privileges of the Community, any direct Act of that Party to the Violation of the State is abſolutely Treaſon: and the State has a Right to proſecute that Party, as Traytors. But this is

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not the Caſe here, nor to the Matter in Diſpute. The Point is, whether a Perſon is not born in a State of Nature and Freedom, and remains ſo 'till he ſhall by ſome Act of his own connect himſelf; and whether being thus connected only upon certain Conditions, The Conditions not being fulfil'd, he can again be diſengag'd.

The Caſe of the *Iriſh* Troops that have been found amongſt the unhappy Party in this late Affair, comes preciſely up to the Matter. They were not in Arms againſt the Government while they lived under the Protection of it. They were born indeed under the Juriſdiction of this Government, but it being a Government to whoſe Principles and Maxims, (that is, to the Conditions by which they muſt be admitted to the full Protection of it,) they cou'd not give their Conſent, they have accordingly never connected themſelves by their own Conſent to it, and therefore are not connected according to the Principles above. But having liv'd under a temporary Allegiance, as due to that Protection which they receiv'd by the Toleration of the Government, have ſome Time ſince reſign'd that Protection, and withdrawn from this Allegiance to the Government under which they were born; have put themſelves under the Protection of another, and they ſay it is now due to that State which ſupports, protects and maintains them; and they are accordingly obeying the Orders of a Government that maintains them, and are fighting the Battles of a Country that receives and ſupports them as its Subjects to

fight their Battles. They are in the Pay of *France*, and therefore owe Military Allegiance to the Military Power; and as Soldiers muſt obey every Order, and act wherever they are commanded. Therefore, as they rightly ſay, you muſt either diſavow your Principles, or forego all Claim and Title to their Allegiance.

*A***. All this Confuſion and falſe Application of theſe Principles ariſes from our talking too crudely of a State of Nature, as the actual natural State of Man's Exiſtence prior to all Government: and of Society, as an artificial Remedy ſuperinduc'd upon this State, by every Individual's actual Conſent to redreſs the Perverſions of the natural Situation.

Thus the common way of conſidering this Point has been in the following manner: To know how Men came to be thus connected together, they have ſuppos'd a Time before they were connected at all, and then from examining the Circumſtances of this State, which they call a State of Nature, they have attempted to find out, what ſhou'd be preciſely and adequately the Cauſe, why Men left this independent State, and connected themſelves in Society or Government; and as there never really in Nature cou'd be any ſuch State, every one have followed their own Fancies in deſcribing it. One Part have painted Mankind running about like Beaſts, feeding in the Fields, and dwelling in Caves and Dens; but of theſe ſome, as Mr. *Hobbs* and his Followers, have made them of the fierce and wild kind; while others rather

rather treat them as tame and domeſtic. Another Part has drawn this Age as a Race of God-like heav'nly Beings, above the ordinary Wants and Paſſions of the preſent degenerate one; and indeed, as the Stagyrite ſays, if Man be taken out of his natural ſocial State, he muſt be ſuppos'd either a God or a Beaſt.

Now I apprehend that this firſt ſetting out, has been the Cauſe of much Confuſion and wild Reaſoning in this Matter; for inſtead of examining what cou'd be the Reaſon of ſuperinducing a Regimen or Government upon *the State of Society which is the real State of Nature*; they ſuppoſe this State to be independent of all communicative Intercourſe, and then ſeek for Reaſons why Men ſhou'd enter into Society or Government which they confound as the ſame thing; whereas the true Method ſeems to me to be, to examine what is the real natural State of Mankind, and then from ſeeing why in ſuch a State they cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt without Government, the Reaſons will appear why they muſt neceſſarily connect and ſubordinate themſelves in Government. Whoever conſiders it in this manner will find, I believe, that the ſocial State or a State of Society is the real State of the Nature of Mankind. To ſeparate and diſtinguiſh the Ideas of what is commonly call'd a State of Nature and a State of Government, for the purpoſes and eaſe of thinking is juſt and ſcientific; but to argue from ſuch a State as an actual exiſting thing, and to refer to that as a Proof from Matter of Fact, is falſe and unphiloſophical.

philoſophical. For Man is not, nor cannot be that wild random independent Being we talk of; but Society, the political State, is the real natural State of Man. Nor is Government a mere voluntary artificial thing, but eſſential to the Nature of Mankind.

That which is of Nature is the State of Nature; now that Man ſhou'd ſubſiſt by and exiſt in Communion is of Nature, therefore the Communion of Mankind is the State of Nature. For Man, whether we conſider him in every State and Circumſtance of Fortune thro' all the Stages of Life, if we look upon him an Infant groveling and crying upon the Ground, thro' Life, to that ſecond more helpleſs Infancy of old Age, we ſhall ſee him in all his Wants and Imperfections incapable of ſupporting and maintaining this ſtrange implicated Frame of Being, ſcarcely in one Inſtance, much leſs thro' all of them. Again. If exiſting in that Habitude of things, which is ſuitable to the Power and Properties of any Being, is its natural State, how preciſely ſo is COMMUNION *that State of Man?* All his Powers and Faculties are form'd for that, all his Affections private, domeſtic and public, not only form'd for it, but incite and drive us into it. There is a Principle of Attraction which we can no more reſiſt to hold ourſelves unconnected, than we cou'd reſiſt that earthly one of Gravity to ſuſpend ourſelves in the Air. Nor is all this in vain and uſeleſs, *'tis the very Spirit of that Syſtem in which we do actually exiſt.* 'Tis that Spirit by which this Syſtem and

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our own Exiſtence muſt be preſerv'd. Man cannot ſubſiſt but by Labour, and the tilling the Ground which is given for his Subſiſtence, and by the working the Fruits and Produce of it: but all theſe things are connected in their Exiſtence, and their Properties are intervove and run into one another: therefore in whatever Point Man labours, his Labour muſt connect him or deſtroy him.

But theſe are abſtruſe Matters and need a DIAGRAM.—Come to this Window—here he threw open the Caſements and we were entertain'd with the moſt noble and delightful Proſpect of a great Tract of Country that I ever ſaw, for the Houſe ſtanding juſt upon the Brink of a Cliff, we look'd over a very extenſive Vale that form'd a kind of Amphitheatre. Our Situation was ſo much above this Country, that, as if we were ſome ſuperior Beings, we cou'd comprehend the whole at one View, and conſider the Parts of it (which if we were amidſt them wou'd more than abſorb our Apprehenſion) as diſtinct and ſmall Portions. We cou'd talk of large Fields of Agriculture, great Tracts of Plantations, and even large Towns, as of very ſimple diſtinct Ideas which we cou'd eaſily manage.—— So very fine a Sight occaſion'd a Pauſe in the Converſation; but after ſome time *A*** reſum'd his Diſcourſe, and ſaid, pointing to a little Farm juſt at the bottom of the Hill; Do ye ſee there that little Cottage juſt under us, here at the bottom of this Cliff? 'tis reckon'd one of the prettieſt little Farms in the Country. You

 ſee,

ſee, by that little Rivulet that paſſes thro' it, how well 'tis water'd, and this Wood that gets up the ſide of the Hill here, belongs to it. That large Paſture that is half enclos'd by the Rivulet is eſteem'd a ſweet bit of Ground, as you may gueſs by its being ſo well ſtock'd; that fine Crop too which looks ſo yellow, and reaches a good way on by the Hill-ſide belongs to the ſame; beyond that, yon large Plain is its fen Meadow; and its home Grounds, ſee here juſt about it, thoſe Cloſes on the left Hand. And from that Garden Spot and Orchard juſt behind the Houſe, and the great Number of Poultry in the Yard, you ſee that it has every thing within itſelf.

You wou'd ſay now that from Induſtry in this little Corner, might be ſerv'd not only all the Wants, but all the comfortable and pleaſureable Enjoyments of Life; and as Matters now ſtand, why ſo they may; and the Farmers that now live in it are, perhaps, the ancienteſt Family in the Country, for the *Mawers* have rented it, Father and Son, in ſucceſſion beyond all Memory; and you ſee by its Produce, and the Condition of its Fences, that it wants no kind of Cultivation and good Huſbandry.—Well, but do you ſee yonder, as far as you can ſee, at the Foot of thoſe Hills (where that great River coming round enters the Proſpect)—towards the Right there—do you ſee ſomething as it were a Wart in the Horizon?——However circumſcrib'd within itſelf and independent this Farm here may ſeem, I can

aſſure it is ſo intimately connected with yon almoſt inviſible Spot that it cou'd not ſubſiſt, nor be what it is without it—If we had the Teleſcope here you wou'd ſee that yon Spot is a *Minery*.—Now tell me how cou'd this Farm be inhabited without Houſes or Hutts, or how cou'd it ſupport its Inhabitants without Culture? But without Tools and Implements we muſt be reduc'd to digging Holes with our Nails to burrough in, and without the Inſtruments of Huſbandry we muſt work, as well as eat, with our Teeth. 'Tis yon Spot that ſupplies the Materials for all theſe Inſtruments, and that Boat there that is coming round yon Reach of the River, is bringing them to that large Town to be made up. Now how do you think that vaſt Multitude of Inhabitants (the Noiſe of which we almoſt hear hither like a humming) can be ſubſiſted, but from that great Tract of Country which lyes round it? So that you ſee this little Spot here is ſo far from being independent, that its Intereſt, its Subſiſtence, is interwoven with the greateſt, the moſt diſtant Parts of this vaſt Tract of Country. But was I to purſue this Conſideration further, thro' all the ſeveral, various, intermediate and collateral Connexions, you wou'd ſee that not only this Spot and its Inhabitants, but every the remoteſt, the beſt and worſt are all ſo inſeparably connected and link'd to each and the whole, *that there is* ONE UNINTERRUPTED CONCATENATION *of a one Intereſt and Exiſtence of the Whole.* If we were to conſider thoſe whoſe

Care is the bringing forth, and producing, and nurturing the ſeveral Products and Fruits of the Earth both internal and external—Next thoſe who work them up through all their innumerable Variety of Frames and Faſhions, to the almoſt infinite Uſes and Purpoſes of Mankind—then all thoſe who prepare and make the Tools and Inſtruments for thoſe to work with — how theſe connect and are connected with the whole——then thoſe who dig and work the Materials of which theſe are made——and then thoſe who diſtribute and vend all to the Conſumer—and laſtly the Means and Method by which all this Intercommunion and Commerce is carried on—Were we minutely to conſider all theſe Links of which theſe are only the Heads, you would look upon this Landſkip before us as one great intricate and exquiſite Piece of Mechaniſm ; which by an almoſt infinite Number of ſubordinate Powers, all ſeverally connecting and connected to each other, all together conſpiring to the one univerſal Movement of the whole, directs its Operations to the nobleſt Purpoſes, the Support and Welfare of Mankind.

Thus we ſhould ſee Man not that diſtinct independent Creature, but how every Individual is link'd in with each other and the whole Community. We ſhould ſee that all Mankind are, as *Charôndas* calls them, Meſſ-mates and Fellow-boarders. —— But theſe are dry Matters before Breakfaſt, and there is no End of them.

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The *Mythologiſts* ſet it in a more eaſy and lively Form; they ſay that *Jupiter*, after he had ſeized his Father, and had taken upon himſelf the Government of the World, came down to Mount *Ida*, or the Peak of ſome high Mountains whoſe Heads are above the Clouds, from thence (as we may do from this Cliff) to ſurvey his Kingdom. But whether it had ſuffer'd any Violence in the late Revolution of Nature, or he had been miſinform'd, is not clear; however inſtead of that fertile fruitful teeming Earth, flowing with Milk and Honey, inhabited by a Race of Men living in Peace and Plenty, feeding on the ſpontaneous Produce of the Earth, and ſleeping on Carpets of Flowers, inſtead of ſuch viſionary Scenes of Nonſenſe, he found it wild, overrun with Weeds, a Land of Thorns and Thiſtles; and Mankind as wild as the Country, and near as ſavage as the Beaſts of it. In ſhort he found Nature in a diſtracted diſunited State; exiſting at Random and by Chance; and going by piecemeal, one part after another, to Wreck and Ruin; and *Chaos* gaining upon his Empire every Age. In that inſtant he took from his Girdle that *golden Chain* eternal and infinite, with which he holds all Things, and pour'd it forth in an inviſible ineffable Manner through every Power and Mode of all Exiſtence, ſo as to interweave the Eſſence of every Creature into one another, and to connect them all, ſo that they could not exiſt, but by and in Communion with one another. So that this Communion of Society is

founded on that univerſal Law of Nature, by which all things, as in ſome golden Chain, are connected and united, upheld and maintain'd in one Syſtem and Co-exiſtence.

Being all thus link'd together in one Communion, in one common Intereſt, they may be properly ſaid to be a Society, a People; but yet having no natural Principle of acting as one whole, they are in a natural Incapacity of managing this common Intereſt: Therefore his next divine Thought was to lay open before the Eye of their Reaſon ſo much of the *Rationale* of this myſtick Chain, as to inſtruct them how they ought to frame and ſubordinate each amongſt themſelves, as to put on a Form capable of ſuch Principle; that there might be ſome one determinate Method, by which this indeterminate and diffuſive Power might be capable to exert itſelf, as the Power of one Body, one Whole. And this Form is what may be call'd *Impire* or Government. And thus, ſays *Plato*, Polity is the Care of the Communion of Mankind *.

*B***. This golden Chain that *lies thus open to the Eye of Reaſon*, may be, for ought I know, very reaſonable, but I want to know *what actually could determine theſe Connexions and Subordinations to be ſuch as they are.* What could determine this our Legiſlator (for ſo likewiſe we will call thoſe Chances and Viciſſitudes of things by which Governments have been brought about)

* Ἐπιμελεία ἀνθρωπίνης συμπάσης κοινωνίας. *Politic.*

What

What could determine *this Legiſlator* to divide the Multitude into the Governed and Governor, and to place the Power of Government in any one Part rather than another? Whence aroſe that Authority and Influence with Power to ſupport and maintain it? I know many, like ſome rough reaſoning *Brennus*, would throw the Sword into the Scale, and ſay, That only ought to turn it. But how came *Brennus* by the Direction of this Sword? How came about thoſe Connexions and Subordinations, by which that *Impire* (which he hath at the Head of the States Forces) was form'd? So again we return to the ſame Queſtion, What is that by which we can preciſely ſay, that the Balance of Power does actually preponderate to this or that Side, and what can be the Matter of ſuch Balance? It cannot be meer brutal Strength or Force; for if ſo, *Caligula*'s Horſe had as good Right to the Conſulſhip of *Rome* as his Maſter.

*A***. Either my own Heedleſsneſs, or your Artfulneſs has drawn me in to preach and dogmatize like any bearded Sophiſt; but I wiſh with all my Soul our good People would come down to Breakfaſt, and ſpoil this Sport, for I am quite ſick of myſelf. But if there is no Help for it, I muſt go on.——Well, to take up again the Philoſopher.

The Poſſeſſions of this Earth, or thoſe things with which a Man muſt be cloath'd and fed, conſiſt of the Products of the Land cultur'd and manufactur'd. Theſe become a Man's either by his having acquir'd ſome Land, or where by being al-

low'd to employ his Labour on another's Land, he has a certain Share in the Products of such Land. This must naturally divide Mankind into two Sorts of Inhabitants, the Landholder and the Labourer. Of which any body, that sees the Course and Vicissitude of human Possessions, will easily know the latter must be the Many, the other the Few; and that the Many must necessarily be dependent, and under the Influence of such Few: And that these Few likewise must be under certain Connexions and Dependencies amongst one another, in proportion to their Interest amongst one another, and their greater or less Influence over the Many: And to this purpose we read in *Aristotle*. If the Government be thus suppos'd to be founded in the Balance of Property, each Part of it will have a Share of such Government in proportion to his Property. For of an hundred *Minæ* it can never be, that he who only contributes, one should have an equal Share in the Distribution with him that bears all the rest of the Dividend, neither in the first Constituents of Government, nor in their Successors the Subjects of the same. * This Balance of Property can alone be (where there is no Violence done to the Vigor of natural Principles) the Matter or Ground of a Ba-

* Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ σύνηλθον, τοσοῦτον μεῖχθσι, ὅσονπερ τῆς κλήσεως—οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μεῖχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκοντα μίαν μνᾶν, τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων. *Arist. de Repub. Lib.* 3. *cap.* 9.

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lance of Power, as we have a moſt illuſtrious Fact in the moſt ancient Account of the *Egyptian* Empire, which was ſettled by *Joſeph*, as it remain'd to the Days of *Diodorus Siculus*. *This* BALANCE OF PROPERTY *can be the only firſt, natural, real and permanent Ground of thoſe Connexions and Subordinations which form an Impire*; however variouſly Authority may afterward build upon it by Intrigue. Such who think it ſufficient to account for this *ſecondary* Principle may ſee the beſt Account of it in one of Sir *William Temple*'s Eſſays on Government. But this Balance of Property is the original real Foundation, and in Proportion to the various and ſeveral Aggregations of it, this *Impire* muſt put on its various Forms.

But further, whoever have taken upon themſelves the Legiſlator (either in Speculation or in Practice, in Treatiſe or in Fact) have failed or ſucceeded according to their Attention to this Point. For this is a Thing really exiſting, and can moreover only exiſt as it hath its Foundation in Nature. For whoever hath attempted to frame and model it *artificially* to their own Schemes, inſtead of building upon it as a Foundation exiſting in Nature, have all found their Schemes *Utopian* and their Legiſlature abortive.

All the leſſer Politicians that have wrote of theſe Matters, have never ſo much as dreamt of this; and many that have had an Eye to it have ſo nodded about it, that they have always treated it as an artificial thing, which was to be fram'd

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and modell'd even any how, juſt as beſt ſuited their Hypotheſes. The firſt that apply'd this Doctrine to Politics, was PHALEAS of *Chalcêdon* *, and his Syſtem was, that all Eſtates ſhould be made equal, and all Degrees levell'd in a free City, and that there ſhould be an open Intercommunion eſtabliſh'd amongſt all and every Citizen. The next that we know of, is HYPODAMUS the *Mileſian*, who in his Treatiſe of Politics, would model this Foundation into three artificial Parts, and upon theſe form his three Kind of Citizens and their ſeveral Natures, the Huſbandman, the Handicraftman, and the Military Order.

But there is one Miſtake which runs through all theſe *Utopian* Levellers, and which they take up one after another even down to Sir *Thomas More*. And it is this. They ſee the natural Connexion that there is between the Balance of Power and the Balance of Property, but think this Balance is a meer artificial Thing, and muſt owe both its Nature and Exiſtence to the Wiſdom of the Legiſlator, not at all conſidering the moſt intimate Connexion there is between this and Nature, that is the Nature of the Country and People where it is found. It is this Conſideration which diſtinguiſhes the *Utopian* from the Politician: And it is this which diſtinguiſhes the great Mr. *Harrington* from theſe Wild-ſhavers. He

* Δοκεῖ τισι περὶ τὰς Οὐσίας εἶναι μέγιστον τὸ διαχθαι καλῶς— διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος. *Ariſt de Rep. Lib.* 2. *cap.* 7.

ſays

ſays indeed, as do all the beſt Writers, that this Balance is to be rectified and regulated by the Hands of the Legiſlator or Miniſter: But that it has its Foundation in Nature, in the Scite and Circumſtances of the Country and People. And though the Government of his *Oceana* may appear in ſo queſtionable a Form; yet as he all along ſuppoſes it to be built on ſuch a Foundation, as where the Balance of Property is in the People, and ſays it can be only true and right as that is Fact or not, we can only condemn it when we know, whether at the Time in which he wrote, there was ſuch a Balance or not in Favour of the People. But if he had been alive at this Day, he could have ſhewn from the ſame Principles, upon which his *Oceana* is founded, that the Conſtitution of our preſent State is founded in Truth and Nature, and therefore legal and right; becauſe his Principles are no viſionary ones of Fancy, but drawn from Nature and Fact.

And further, free Governments muſt not only be founded, and originally conſtituted upon this Balance, but muſt be adminiſter'd likewiſe upon theſe Principles. However the Forms of Government may have aroſe upon this, it is from this alone that they can take their Policy. For wherever the landed Property is, there will (unleſs there be ſome unnatural factious Violence againſt the Vigour of theſe Principles) be alſo the Power.

Now

Now in an induſtrious trading and free Nation this naturally will be often ſhifting and changing Hands. Thus, ſays *Plato* *, come about the Revolutions and Changes of Power in a Government. And thus, for Inſtance, the Democracy gains upon the Few. "While the young Nobles, attending to nothing but their Pleaſure, "indulge in every Extravagancy of Expence, "the People partly by Purchaſe, and partly "from eating into their Eſtates by Uſury, buy "them out more and more every Day, and every "Day become more rich and more powerful, "till the whole Balance ſhall have ſhifted into "their Hands." Now while the old Poſſeſſors that have parted with the Land, are unwilling to part with the Power that hath lain ſo long in their Hands, ariſe thoſe Struggles which are the only real Parties in a free Government. But verily at laſt the Power muſt follow too. And then thoſe old Families that formerly had it, think the Conſtitution is corrupted, and the true Balance deſtroy'd. And, as in all wiſe and free States, there will be a mutual Connexion between the Men of Property and the Government, this will naturally give Riſe to theſe old Conſtitutioniſts to conſider the Government and Country as in two different, if not direct contrary Intereſts. This has been eminently the Caſe in all thoſe great Shiftings of Property that have happen'd in this Kingdom: As at the

* De Repub. *Lib.* 8. *p.* 555. *Edit.* Serrani.

Time

Time of the Reformation, when Trade firſt began to flouriſh, and the Commonalty to grow Conſiderable: and it was upon the Humour that took Riſe from a like Occaſion not half a Century ago, that the artful Author of *The Diſſertation on Parties* has engrafted that invidious and miſchievous Diſtinction of *Court* and *Country Intereſt*.

Now if we conſider thoſe Struggles and Parties that happen in a free Government, by theſe Principles; we ſhall have no Reaſon to make ſuch Governments conſiſt of ſuch heterogeneous Stuff, as different and diſtinct Intereſts. For whatever real Parties there can be in a free Government, they can only ariſe from the changing and ſhifting of this Balance while the Power is getting into other Hands than where it was before; but wherever it goes, if it be no further extended, and no otherwiſe founded, than on the Balance of real Property, it is equally legal and true, be it in the Hands of the Many, the Few, or even One. But wherever there is any popular Tumult on one Hand; or Cabal of the Few, or Tyranny of the One, on the other, that aims to do Violence to the Vigor of theſe natural Principles; ſuch Party becomes a Faction; and it becomes the Duty of every honeſt Man to oppoſe it with all his Might, and with all his Strength to endeavour to cruſh ſuch Faction.

Upon

Upon this Balance have all Governments that have been able to ſubſiſt and maintain themſelves been form'd or aroſe. Whether they have been form'd at once where ſome *good and great Man* has ſhewn the Community this Balance, and form'd and faſhioned their ſeveral Connexions and Subordinations accordingly: as thoſe of *Crete*, *Lacedemon* and *Carthage:* or where by degrees and length of Time, fluctuating by all the Changes and Chances of Fortune, thro' all the Viciſſitudes of Time, and revolving from one Extreme of utmoſt Hazard and Ruin to another, from being tried and experienc'd in every Evil that can be ſurviv'd, *The People* themſelves have come, as it were, to feel it out; as in *Athens* and *Rome*.

The conſidering the Matter in this or ſome ſuch Light wou'd free this Subject from all the Difficulties and Objections with which it is attended. For you ſee by this how every Man is even from his Birth, and in that State of Nature which we talk of, ſo connected to the Community, that his Attachment is indiſſolvable but by the Diſſolution of the Community; and you perceive how all thoſe Ties by which he is connectd and ſubordinate, ſpring naturally one from another to the utmoſt Strictures of Government, and yet all conſiſtent with that Liberty, which is conſiſtent with the natural State of Man, the Social. But it yet remains, whether upon the Application of theſe Principles to the *real Exerciſe and adminiſtring* of Govern-

Government, whether they will be found throughout conſiſtent with that true Policy which is founded in Liberty. For if theſe be true you may ſee that a Subject is inſeparably connected with the Government: but how this can be, and how it can be conſiſtent with Liberty, muſt remain a Doubt.

*B***. But it muſt not remain ſo; I own I ſhou'd be very glad to ſee a fair Plan of your reaſoning; and not only a Plan, but rather an intire Structure of your Syſtem: it wou'd give me great Satisfaction to ſee how theſe Doctrines hang together; and I ſhou'd be heartily pleas'd to reconcile your Principles and your Politics.

*A***. As nothing wou'd give me greater Satisfaction than to vindicate myſelf to one of your Judgment, I will endeavour to do it; but if it is to be done by framing Hypotheſes and building Syſtems, neither my Abilities nor my Inclination will befriend me. I had once occaſion to be pretty much with ſome of thoſe *Iriſh* Officers in the *French* Service (whoſe Caſe we juſt now mention'd) I had frequent Opportunity of converſing freely with them; and this very Subject, amongſt many others, was a Topic of our Converſation: there was amongſt them a Perſon of Spirit and Learning; and I freely own that theſe very Arguments, which you now uſe, he wou'd urge with ſuch Force, and under Colour of ſuch enlarg'd Benevolence, that half charm'd with the Appearance of his Humanity, I have been often

often dazled with the Speciouſneſs of his Reaſoning: And as it was a Subject I had but little conſider'd I cou'd little anſwer his Arguments. However, I was very careful to remember them, and even to write them down. And ſince that time I have drawn together ſeveral Reaſonings by way of Anſwer to them, which if you think it worth your while to hear, you may: ſo if you like it after Breakfaſt, we will retire into the Study.

FINIS.

BRITISH MUSEUM

ERRATUM.

Page 33, line 5. of the note, for σύμβολῳ read σύμβολα.